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Let’s say you like to write noir or bizarre or absurd. Let’s say you like to craft tales that plumb the psycho-sexual depths, that skirt along the limits of human behaviour. But let’s say you’ve run out of ideas. You want to get out of your writing slump, but you don’t know where to turn for help. There are all kinds of writing prompts out there that involve butterflies and kittens and little tiffs between yuppies sharing a morning coffee. But you want to get down and dirty. You want prompts that are beyond edgy. You want to take your inner Emile Zola slice-of-life sensibility, lock it in Guantanamo Bay, waterboard it, then launch drone attacks at it until it’s fried to a crisp. So where do you go? Here’s a suggestion: go to one of Canada’s oldest and most revered institutions. Go to the Supreme Court of Canada. More specifically, go to the SCC’s online archive of decisions where you can browse 138 years of Canadian depravity.
Here are some tips for browsing the cases:
1. Only look at the criminal appeals. All the other stuff is boring.
2. Only read the statement of facts. All the other stuff is boring.
3. Cases with initials involve minors or rape victims and therefore (sadly) also provide some of the most useful material.
4. For U.S. readers: the “R” stands for Regina (i.e. The Queen) and is the equivalent of “The People” in cases from the U.S. Supreme Court.
Here are some samples of scenarios you might want to explore in your writing:
One evening, in the course of sexual relations, J.A. placed his hands around the throat of his long-term partner K.D. and choked her until she was unconscious. At trial, K.D. estimated that she was unconscious for “less than three minutes”. She testified that she consented to J.A. choking her, and understood that she might lose consciousness. She stated that she and J.A. had experimented with erotic asphyxiation, and that she had lost consciousness before. When K.D. regained consciousness, her hands were tied behind her back, and J.A. was inserting a dildo into her anus. K.D. gave conflicting testimony about whether this was the first time J.A. had inserted a dildo into her anus. J.A. removed the dildo ten seconds after she regained consciousness. The two then had vaginal intercourse. When they finished, J.A. cut K.D.’s hands loose.
K.D. made a complaint to the police two months later and stated that while she consented to the choking, she had not consented to the sexual activity that had occurred. She later recanted her allegation, claiming that she made the complaint because J.A. threatened to seek sole custody of their young son. The trial judge convicted J.A. of sexual assault. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and dismissed the charges against J.A.
Held (Binnie, LeBel and Fish JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed and the respondent’s conviction for sexual assault restored.
The accused was charged with keeping a common bawdy-house for the practice of acts of indecency under s. 210(1) of the Criminal Code. The accused operated a club in Montréal the purpose of which was to permit couples and single people to meet each other for group sex. Only members and their guests were admitted to the club. Prospective members were interviewed to ensure that they were aware of the nature of the activities of the club. Members paid an annual membership fee. A doorman manned the main door of the club, to ensure that only members and their guests entered. The club had three floors. The first floor was occupied by a bar, the second a salon, and the third the “apartment” of the accused. Two doors separated the third floor apartment from the rest of the club. One was marked “Privé” and the other was locked with a numeric key pad. Members of the club were supplied with the appropriate code and permitted to gain access to the third floor apartment. This was the only place where group sex took place. Entry to the club and participation in the activities were voluntary. At trial, the accused was convicted. The trial judge found that the accused’s apartment fell within the meaning of “public place”, as defined in s. 197(1) of the Criminal Code. She also found social harm in the fact that sexual exchanges took place in the presence of other members of the club. She concluded that this conduct was indecent under the Criminal Code because it was degrading and dehumanizing, was calculated to induce anti-social behaviour in its disregard for moral values, and raised the risk of sexually transmitted diseases. A majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal upheld the accused’s conviction.
Held (Bastarache and LeBel JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed and the accused’s conviction set aside.
The accused was observed masturbating near the uncovered window of his illuminated living room by neighbours from the privacy of their darkened bedroom, across contiguous back yards, from a distance of 90 to 150 feet. The police were summoned. They observed the accused from “just below the navel up” from the neighbour’s bedroom and “from about maybe the neck or the shoulders up” from street level. The accused was charged under ss. 173(1)(a) and 173(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. Section 173(1) makes it an offence to wilfully do an indecent act (a) “in a public place in the presence of one or more persons”, or (b) “in any place, with intent thereby to insult or offend any person”. The trial judge convicted the accused under s. 173(1)(a) after finding he had converted his living room into a “public place” but acquitted him under s. 173(1)(b) after finding that it did not appear the accused knew he was being watched or intended to insult or offend any person. The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal of British Columbia upheld the conviction. The Court of Appeal concluded that the accused had “intentionally conducted himself in an indecent way, seeking to draw the attention of others”.
Held: The appeal should be allowed. The accused’s conviction is vacated and an acquittal entered.
The accused worked as a garage mechanic. He received a call from R, a disgruntled former employee, who said, “We’re coming to get you, pigs.” The accused later heard from a co-worker that the victim had been offered a contract to kill both of them. Feeling that he was being watched and followed, the accused purchased a firearm. One evening, the accused thought he saw R lurking outside his home. The co-worker came by to check, but noticed nothing unusual. During the night, after smoking marijuana, the accused thought he heard someone breaking into his home. He fired the gun at doors and windows and into walls and concluded that he had shot the intruders. Seeing the victim at the garage the next day, the accused shot and killed him. Before a judge and jury, the accused pleaded mental disorder automatism. Several psychiatrists gave evidence. The judge refused to put this defence to the jury on the ground that the required evidential foundation had not been laid. The accused was convicted of first degree murder. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed. The accused’s defence of mental disorder automatism should have been put to the jury.
(I know I said: don’t read for anything other than the facts, but the next case is really interesting quite apart from the fact that it involves a triple axe murder: can silence be used as evidence of guilt?)
The accused went to a police station and asked that a car be sent to the ranch where he lived. Despite repeated questions from the police, he refused to explain why a car was necessary or what would be found there. The officers dispatched to the ranch discovered three victims. All three died from axe wounds to the head. The accused was charged with three counts of second degree murder. At trial, the evidence against the accused was entirely circumstantial. He admitted finding the victims but denied killing them. With respect to the accused’s refusal to respond to some police questioning, the trial judge told the jury that this silence was “post-offence conduct” and that an inference of guilt could be drawn from it. The jury found the accused guilty, but the Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed.
The evidence of the accused’s silence was not admissible as post-offence conduct. The right to silence would be illusory if the decision not to speak to the police could be used by the Crown as evidence of guilt.
Now get writing!